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In many markets, the successful entrepreneur is the one who has the
skill to plan his production in advance to take advantage of predicted
demand conditions. Production takes time, and the entrepreneur who
waits until the last moment to expand or contract production may often
earn lower profits than an entrepreneur with better forecasting skills. In
fact, a large fraction of many managers' time is spent trying to figure out
what demand will be and how best to meet it.It is clear that early
revelation of demand has a benefit from society's veiwpoint since it gives
suppliers notice to expand or contract production. It is also clear that it
may be costly to forecast demand.
How does information get transmitted from demanders to suppliers in
a market? We show that a competitive market is not well suited to the
efficient transmission of this information. We then show how a firm with
some monopoly power will have a greater incentive than competitive
firms to cause this transmission of information to occur. The stability of
markets over time—measured in terms of price and quantity variance—
will differ greatly depending on whether planning takes place or not. We
argue that, when planning is possible, a market structure with some
monopoly power may emerge. This market will have more quantity
variation and less price variation than would the same market if it were
competitively organized. To obtain insight into the likely behavior of a
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marketstructure with firms possessing some monopoly power, we ana-
lyze the behavior of a market with a dominant firm(s) and competitive
fringe. The dominant firm will have an incentive to invest in information
while the competitive fringe will not. The size of the competitive fringe
will depend on such things as information costs and demand variability.
The competitive fringe shrinks when there is a decrease in the marginal
cost of information or an increase in the uncertainty of demand. An
interesting result is that the dominant firm may choose to produce in
some states of demand even though it knows for sure that prices will not
cover constant marginal cost. This result occurs because the dominant
firm realizes that the size of the competitive fringe responds to the
dominant firm's production strategy. The dominant firm keeps prices low a1
in some realizations of demand to make entry of new firms unattractive.
This strategy turns out to be profit maximizing since the strategy increases
the monopoly power of the dominant firm when demand is high. Such a
strategy is closely related to the concepts of "predatory" or "limit"
pricing. However, instead of having the undesirable welfare conse-
quences usually associated with "predatory" pricing, in this case the
strategy produces a market outcome that is superior to that of both
competition and pure monopoly. c
g
2.2Competitive Case
We want to investigate the case where there are many demanders each
arandom demand that makes a negligible contribution to
total demand, which will also be random. Initially, we let the random
demands of each demander be independent of each other. Both the mean
and variance of total demand are finite, even though we have many
demanders. At a cost, the realization of random demand for any fraction u
of the market can be discovered early enough to allow suppliers to adjust e
their production plans if necessary. (An alternative interpretationthat e
at a cost the prediction error of forecast can be reduced.) e
To formally model this situation we proceed as follows.' Let total ti1
demand be random and be given by a—p + €, whereis a normal random a
variable with mean 0 and variancea is a constant, and p is price.2
Imagine a continuum of demanders between [0,1], and let W(Z) be
defined as a normal random variable with mean Z(a—p) and variance
Za2,Z E [0,1]. W(Z) can be interpreted as the random demand for the pfl
first fraction Z of the market. Assume that the random demands of any
nonoverlapping interval of demanders are independent of each other so
that the increment to total demand by agents in the interval [Z0, Z0 + dZ]
is independent of the level of demand W(Z0) for the first fraction Z0 of the
market. W(Z) is then a Wiener process with W(1) equaling a —p + €. in'49 Planning and Market Structure
a- Suppose that at a cost it is possible to determine the realization of the
random component of demand one period early.3 Suppose that demand-
)fl ers are ordered in terms of increasing cost of acquiring information so
that it costs C(F) to learn in advance the demands of the first Fpercent4 of
the market with C'(F) >0 and C'(F) > 0. If a firm has devoted C(F)
at resources to information gathering, then it follows from the properties of




where V1 and V2 are independent normal random variables, with mean 0
and variance o.2,andwhere the realization of V1 becomes known to the
firm but that of V2 remains unknown at the time the firm must make some
productive decisions.5
a Competitive risk neutral suppliers must produce6 one period before all
demand is costlessly revealed. Only if someone has invested resources to
predict demand wilt suppliers know enough to adapt to changes in de-
mand. There are constant returns to production rates, which are required
:h to be finite. Let it cost ctoproduce one unit of the good. No production
can take place once the market opens. For simplicity we assume that the
good cannot be stored for more than one period. Therefore, the supply of
the good in any period is exactly equal to the previous period's produc-
tion. A risk neutral supplier will sign a fixed price forward contract to sell
atpricep* only if the expected price paid on the spot marketj5 is less than
o or equal top*. Hence, a supplier will offer fixed price contracts only ifp*
U ￿j5.
n If no information about the random components of demand is available
y to any supplier, then ex ante a supply firm's random profit stream is
n unchanged over time and each supplier will produce a fixed amount. In
equilibrium, the total market supply S must be such that expected price
it equals the cost of production c.Forthe linear demand curve presented
earlier, it is straightforward to show that, in equilibrium with no informa-
tion about the randomness in demand, S =a—c, p=c +€,E(p) =
n and var (,,)=
•2 It is clear that if it were always possible for suppliers to expand and
e contract production so that price equaled c,thensociety would be operat-
e ing efficiently. Exactly the amount demanded would be produced at a
e price equal to the marginal cost. If information acquisition and transmis-
y sion are costless, we can imagine demanders costlessly announcing their
o demands in advance and the market responding efficiently.
What happens when information acquisition is not costless? Clearly,
vie forsufficiently small information costs it will still be efficient for invest-
ment in information to occur to enable the planning of next period's50 Dennis W. Canton
supply. However, in this situation each demander will have no incentive
to spend resources to figure out his demand and a supplier will have no
incentiveto purchase information from an individual demander.
Although society would be made better off by information investment
and transmission, individual agents do not invest in information because
they do not perceive the general equilibrium effects of their (collective)
noninvestment in information since each agent by assumption is infinites-
imal and thus correctly ignores the effect of his actions on the price
distribution.
To illustrate the lack of incentives for information transmission, first
consider a demander. A demander has two choices. He can choose not to
invest in information and next period pay random pricep, or he can spend
some amount S to figure out his next period's demand.7 If he has invested
in information, he can sell his information to a supplier (only one for 9
now)for some amount .1andthen buy on the spot market paying random
price p. Because the demander is small, his information has no effect on
the distribution of p. Alternatively, instead of the demander separately
selling his information and then buying on the spot market, we can
imagine the demander being offered a fixed price forward contract at
somein return for his information. A demander prefers to face a
variable price distribution rather than a price stabilized at the mean of the
price distribution. Under variable prices the demander could consume
the fixed amount he finds optimal under the fixed mean price. However,
substitution possibilities enable the demander to take advantage of the
variableprice by consuming more of the product when its price is lowand
less of the product when its price is high. In this way demanders can
achieve higher utility or profits. Stated in another way, since the expendi-
ture function (if the demander is a consumer) and the cost function (if the
demander is a firm) are concave in price, Jensen's inequality ensures that
demanders have a preference for a variable price instead of a price
stabilized at the mean.8 For the buyer to accept a contract with fixed price
p* p* would have to be below j3, where j3 is the expectedspot price;
otherwise, it follows from the above discussion that there is no expected
gain to the demander from investing in the information.
Now consider suppliers. How much would any one supplier pay for
information from an individual demander? An individual demander has
no influence on price, and since each supplier can sell all he wants at the
(unknown) market price next period, no supplier has an incentive to buy
(valueless) information from one demander. This means that the amount
I a supplier would pay for information from one demander is zero.9 The
same reasoning shows that a risk neutral supplier would never sign a fixed
price contract at p*, if p* < j5, in return for knowing an individual's
demand. Since the demander invests in information only if he can either
sell the information for I> S or sign a fixed price contract atp*, with p8 <r
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we see that under the stated assumptions in a competitive market no
incentive for information transmission between individual buyers and
10 sellers will arise if it is costly to acquire information.
r. In the above discussion we only considered information transmission
flt between one demander and one seller. A demander was not allowed to
resell his information. Information from one demander (of measure zero)
is valueless to a firm. However, it is true that information from a number
S of demanders (of positive measure) is valuable since their demand will
influence price. Could one imagine a market in which each supplying firm
pays an infinitesimal amount to a group of demanders and thus each
St supplier knows something about the entire demand? The special prob-
:0 lems associated with information suggest that such an information market
may not be feasible. Since these problems have been extensively dis-
cussed in the literature (see, e.g., Arrow 1971; Green 1973; Grossman
1976, 1977; Grossman and Stiglitz 1976, 1980), we give only a brief
discussion here.
First, consider the monitoring problem. Is each supplier expected to
keep track of the accuracy of each of the infinite number of demanders'
response? (Notice that an exchange of information between a demander
it and a supplier automatically does this if the demander reveals his in-
a formation to a supplier by signing a purchase contract specifying a quan-
e tity and if the demander does not break the contract.) Second and more
•e important, whenever a group of suppliers obtain information about de-
mand, the only possible equilibrium consistent with competitive assump-
e tions is one in which the suppliers adjust production until expected price
d equals the constant marginal cost c.Whenthis happens, the incentives of
supplying firms to invest resources to learn total demand in order to
predict price totally vanish.'0
e Could there be a competitive equilibrium in which supplying firms have
different information sets purchased from different groups of demand-
ers? The answer again is no because the supplying firms would then have
incentives to merge their information sets to improve the accuracy of
their demand forecasts and then we would return to the situation just
discussed where expected price would fall to constant marginal cost c,or
else to a situation where the firms would collectively try to earn a return
r on the information by cartelizing and behaving monopofistically. Could a
trade association form, assess fees on supplying firms, and provide incen-
tives for some demanders to figure out and reveal their future demands?
For the reasons just discussed it would be difficult to enforce participation
in the association." But even if a trade association did organize, it is
plausible that the trade association would not only coordinate informa-
tion flowsbut also serve as a vehicle toward cartelization of the industry.
r Infact, any time the information is provided by one central source, the
possessor of the information can become a producer and behave monop-52 Dennis W. Canton
olistically to take advantage of the information. In short, purely competi-
tive behavior and information transmission do not seem compatible in the
model under examination.
The same exact problems persist in the case where individual demands
are correlated. Any time firms have spent resources to acquire the same
information set, they have an incentive to merge to avoid the duplicative
costs of acquiring the same information. Any time firms have different
information sets, they have an incentive to merge to pool information to 9
more accurately predict demand. Any time a group of competitive firms
obtain information about demand, the only possible equilibrium consis-
tent with competitive behavior requires production to be adjusted until
expected price equals constant marginal
The conclusion of this analysis is that under competition there is no
mechanism to ensure that investment in information occurs to the degree
that society finds optimal. In the special case just examined here, no
investment occurs. This does not mean that there can never be situations
in which competitive supplying firms have an incentive to discover de-
mand by offering a lower price to those who order in advance, only that it
is unlikely that a competitive environment will provide the correct invest-
ment incentives. For example, if those who order in advance are less
costly to serve, if supply curves are upward sloping, or if firms can lower J
operatingcosts by reducing the variability of their cash flow, then we can
expect some forward contracts to emerge which will as a by-product
transmit information from suppliers to demanders. (See Carlton 1978,
1979a, 1979b, for incentives for forward contracting.) The point is that
although forward contracts may come into existence even when it is costly
to obtain information on demand, the correct incentives to transmit
information will not necessarily be provided.
We have argued that for the market conditions under examination
there may be incentives for mergers. In an industry where information
considerations, and not other issues like probability of obtaining dcliv-
cry, are important, it is plausible to expect that the industry may evolve o4
until one large firm (or a few) emerges which has some market power. It is
only by the acquisition of market power that a firm in the model acquires
an incentive to invest in information. Information is valuable only if the
recipients of the information have the power to prevent industry produc-
tion from expanding to the point where expected price equals constant
marginal cost.3 Before we examine the stability and consequences of this
market power, let us investigate and compare the behavior of a monopo-
list and a social planner.
amonopolist operate—would he have an incentive to
invest in information, and would he invest an optimal amount? Let us use frr
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i- the simple example of the previous section to illustrate the monopolist's
e incentives to invest in information. Suppose as before that there is a
continuum of demanders between 0 and 1, that demanders are ordered in
Is terms of the increasing cost of eliciting information, and that the demands
e of agents in nonoverlapping intervals are independent. Let F be the
e number between 0 and 1 such that all information about demanders
it between 0 and F is collected while information about all demanders
o between Fand 1 is not.'4 By the argument given in the previous section,
IS the demand curve the monopolist sees after his collection of information
can be written as
il
o where V1 and V2 are independent normal variables with mean 0 and
e variance a2, and where the realization of V1 is observed by the monopolist
O before production occurs.
S Conditional on knowing V1 and F, the monopolist must decide how
much to produce and offer on the market next period. The price will be
it random and will equate supply to demand. Production S occurs before
total demand is observed, and it costs c to produce .a unit of the good.
The monopolist sets S to maximize expected profits,'5 which are given
by
n
• E(m(S)1V1, F) =E[p—c]S.
I,






•E('rr(S) IF) =S(a—S+ V1 —c).
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SinceF must be chosen before V1 is observed, the expected value H
from observing the fraction F of the population is'654 Dennis W. Carlton
H(fl =E(ir( V1,fl=E Vi)(a
Expected profits are increasing in Fand a2. Marginal expected profits
are increasing in cr2.If C(F) is the cost of acquiring information on
fraction F of the population, then the optimal (interior) F satisfies
H'(F)= C'(F)andC'(F)>O.
Three solutions arepossible.Either (a)F= 0 and C'(O)￿H'(O),
(b) 0< F< 1and C(F)risesfaster than H(F), or(c) F =1and
It immediately follows that investment in information will
be higher the higher is or2 and the lower is the marginal cost of information
schedule.
The monopolist has an incentive to invest in information because by
learning about demand next period he is better able to plan production
this period and thereby more fully exploit his monopoly power next
period. The expected monopoly price is (a + c)12, which exceeds the
expected competitive price c derived in the previous section; the variance
of the monopoly price is cr2(1 —(3F/4)),which is lower than the variance
of the competitive price a2; while the variance of the quantity is (F/4)a2,
which of course exceeds the zero variance in quantity supplied under
competition. As one would expect, planning reduces price variance but
increases quantity variance.
2.4Social Planner
How would a social planner invest in information to maximize ex-
pected consumer surplus?'7 Using the same production and demand
example as before, we have that, conditional on observing V1 for fraction
F of the population, consumer surplus equals
SUR(S, F, V1) =f[a+ V1 + V(i —fl V2—dq —cS.
Expected surplus'8 conditional on V1 and F is therefore
SUR(S, F, V2) =[a+ V1 —c]S—j-. t
The optimal values satisfy S =(a+ V1 —c),p =c+ V2,
variance (p) (1 —F)a2,variance (S) =For2,and SUR =(a+ V1 '1








The marginal benefits of increasing F are greater for the social planner
than for the monopolist versus u2/4); therefore, the monopolist
underinvests in information. The intuitive reason for the discrepancy in
incentives is the usual one that explains why a monopolist's conduct is not
efficient. The benefit to the social planner of finding out and satisfying
some increase in demand is related to the area bounded by the initial
expected demand curve, the new demand curve, and the marginal cost
curve. In contrast, the corresponding benefit to the monopolist is related
to the area bounded by the initial expected marginal revenue curve, the
new marginal revenue curve, and the marginal cost curve. For the linear
example, this latter area is always smaller than the former.
The optimal solution involves a higher value to information than the
monopolist calculates. The monopolist underinvests in information rela-
tive to the social optimum, but overinvests relative to the competitive
outcome. This is a general result that will tend to occur so long as the
marginal revenue curve shifts less than the demand curve in response to
each new piece of information.t9 The variance of price in the socially
optimal solution is lower than in the monopoly solution (whose price
variance is lower than in the competitive solution). The variance of
quantity in the socially optimal solution is higher than in the monopoly
solution (whose quantity variance is higher than in the competitive solu-
tion).
2.5Comparison of Monopoly and Competition
Which is worse, having a monopolist who does some information
processing or having competitors who do none? To obtain some insight
into this question, let us compare the competitive solution with no
planning to the monopoly solution under the extreme assumption that the
monopolist plans perfectly and that we ignore the costs of information
gathering. This comparison will provide us with the most favorable case2°
to monopoly and will allow us to draw conclusions about the maximum
trade-off between planning efficiency and deadweight loss.
If the demand curve is q =a—p+withca normal random variable
with -mean 0 and variance a2, and constant marginal production costs are
c,then(from section 2.2) in equilibrium under competition no planning
occurs and the amount supplied will equal a —c, theexpected price will
equal c,theactual price will equal c+ €, andthe variance of price will
equal a2. In comparison to the ideal world of perfect planning, we can
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calculate the expected deadweight loss that comes from not planning. For
each realization of €,wecan regard the competitive equilibrium as
resulting from an imposition of a (random) tax equal to the discrepancy
between actual price and the constant marginal cost c. This discrepancy
equals €.Sincethe demand curve has slope —1,the expected value of the
resulting deadweight loss equals whereis the variance of €.
Ifwe calculate the deadweight loss of a monopolist who plans relative
to the ideal world of marginal cost pricing and planning, we see from
section 2.3 that the discrepancy between price and marginal cost for any
realizationequals((a —c)12)+(€12)so that the expected deadweight loss
equals ((a —c)2/8)+(ci.2/8).The deadweight loss of monopoly that results
from nonmarginal cost pricing rises slower as ri.2increasesthan does the
deadweight loss from (unplanned) competition (that also results in [ex
post] nonmarginal cost pricing). For very large values ofthedead-
weight loss from monopoly power is swamped by the deadweight loss that
results from not planning, while exactly the opposite is the case for small
values of o.2
Howlarge does €i.2haveto be before monopoly is better than competi-
tion? The answer is when=(a—c)/\/i Theaverage level of demand at
the competitive price equals a —c.Therefore, the implied coefficient of
variation necessary for monopoly to be preferred to competition is about
.58. This strikes me as a fairly high value. For example, in many manufac-
turing markets a conservative estimate (95 percent confidence interval) of
demand would be, say, ±20 percent of the previous year's level (correct-
ing for trend). Using the normal distribution as an approximation, this
would approximately imply a coefficient of variation of only .1. Only if
one felt that an interval slightly larger than 0 to twice the level of average
demand represented a 95 percent confidence interval would the coef-
ficient of variation rise to 58.
In order to see whether the above results were robust to a different
specification of demand, I redid the calculations for demand curves of the
form A0v/p"1, where A0 is a constant,is the price elasticity, and v is
assumed to be lognormally distributed with mean 0 and variance ri.2.
Table2.1 reports the threshold value for ci. beyond which monopoly with
planning is superior to unplanned competition.
The standard deviationgives an idea of the proportional variation in
demand. For example, a ci. =ln2 (.69) would imply that a 95 percent
confidence interval would include demands that were approximately
between ¼ and 4 times the average level. Even the lowest threshold value
of .82 in table 2.1 suggests that a 95 percent confidence region would have 4
tobe larger than ¼ to 4 times the average demand level. Again, the levels
of demand variation that are required before monopoly deadweight
.,
So -.. S STable 2.1 Threshold Values ofbeyond Which Monopoly
Dominates Competition






losses are exceeded by planning losses seems so high as not to be applic-
able to most industries.
The above numerical calculations suggest that it is unlikely that the
planning.benefit that accompanies monopoly will exceed the deadweight
inefficiency loss that also accompanies monopoly. However, there are
two very good reasons to believe that the above (standard) framework for
calculating deadweight losses may be inappropriate in this instance.
Unfortunately, the quantitative significance of these effects are difficult
to assess.
The first qualification relates to a point made by Stigler (1939) in regard
to a cost function and adjustment costs. If the output of a firm must vary,
then the cost of producing might well depend on how adaptable the
technology is. If adjustment costs are an increasing convex function of the
adjustment (e.g., Lucas 1967), then the implied variability of output in
the social optimum will be lower than that implied by the above
framework, where constant returns to scale are postulated. This suggests
that the difference between the socially optimal output and the competi-
tive output will diminish relative to that between the socially optimal
output and the monopoly output. The position of competition relative to
monopoly would then improve from that portrayed in table 2.1.
A second qualification is that itis inappropriate to use the same
demand curve to calculate the monopoly deadweight loss and the com-
petitive price fluctuations that will prevail in response to demand shifts.
Demand curves, like supply curves, have a time dimension associated
with them that depends on adjustment costs. In the very short run most
demand curves are probably very inelastic because it takes consumers
time to adapt to any price change. Although it would take us too far afield
to discuss how the formation of expectations of future prices is affected by
current price, it seems clear that the monopoly price markup is based not
on the "short-run" elasticity of demand but on a "long-run" elasticity of
demand, provided the firm wishes to continue in business.2' However,
when calculating how price will fluctuate in the unplanned competitive
world, the short-run demand curve is the appropriate one to use since no
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one firm has an incentive to concern itself with the effect of its actions on
future price expectations. Although applying Stigler's (1939) reasoning
to input price fluctuations leads us to expect the short-run demand curve
to be more elastic the more variable prices are (i.e., demander firms pay
to have a technology with lots of substitutability),22 it still seems plausible
to expect that the relevant short-run demand elasticity determining price
fluctuations under (unplanned) competition could be lower than the
elasticity determining the monopoly markup. When this is the case, the
results of table 2.1 will understate the deadweight losses under competi-
tion that arise from not planning relative to those that arise from
monopoly power with planning.
2.6Dominant Firm and Competitive Fringe
SI
In this section the behavior of an industry structure with a dominant
firm and a competitive fringe is examined. There are at least two reasons
to justify such a market structure in the model being examined. First,
suppose that only one firm (or a few firms which decide to collude) has
access to an information acquisition technology. Then this firm would
become a dominant firm which would use information on demand to ti
determine its output, which the firm realizes affects price. Free entry and
access to the production technology would ensure that a nonpianning
competitive fringe would continue to enter as long as expected price
exceeded constant marginal production costs.
The second reason justifying a market structure with a dominant firm
that plans and a competitive fringe that does not plan is based on the f4 4
earlierdiscussion where we argued that firms would have an incentive to
merge for information The merged firm would have to acquire
some market power if it were to continue to have an incentive to acquire
information. But how, with free entry, could the merged firm maintain its
market power? There are at least two possible answers. Once the merged c
firm is created and it collects information and earns above-normal profits,
it would be necessary for another firm to enter and do whatever the v
merged firm was doing in order to erode the monopoly profits. The
second firm to enter realizes that its profitability will depend on the initial k
firm's behavior in response to its entry. When such interdependence
arrange ménts are necessary to determine the profitability of entry, entry
is thought to be more difficult than when entry can occur on a small scale
with market conditions taken as given. In Barriers to New Competition,
Bain (1956) labeled such a condition an economy-of-scale barrier to
entry. A second possible explanation of why the large merged firm with ol
market power can persist utilizes Stigler's (1964) theory of oligopoly.
Suppose that all firms which acquire information collude but that there is
a cost to enforcing the collusive agreements.24 These costs rise as the (4
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1 number of firms taking part in the collusive arrangement increases.25
Equilibrium will require that firms be indifferent between joining the
a collusivearrangement or remaining outside the arrangement and not
collecting information. In terms of the assumptions of the model, this
would require that the competitive fringe (which does not plan) earn zero
a profitsand that the number of firms which belong to the cartel be such
that enforcement costs dissipate the profits of the cartel. The cartel would
have market power in the sense that they take into account their effect on
- price.
Regardless of which reason is responsible for the existence of a market
structure with a dominant firm (or colluding firms) and a competitive
fringe, the interesting feature of this market structure is that the domi-
nant firm will take into account how its production strategy influences the
size of the competitive fringe. The competitive fringe will affect but not
t eliminate the market power of the dominant firm. The reason is that, as
s before, production decisions must be made before demand is observed.
The competitive fringe which does not invest in information will there-
s fore base its output decisions on expected price, which in equilibrium
i must equal the constant marginal production cost. The dominant firm, on
) the other hand, is in the position of having invested in information to
i obtain an advance reading on demand before it produces. The dominant
firm will produce little in low realizations of demand and a lot in high
realizations of demand. The competitive fringe remains finite despite
constant returns to scale precisely because of its inability to forecast
demand as accurately as the dominant firm. The size of the competitive
fringe will be endogenously determined by the price distribution, which
) itself is endogenously influenced by the dominant firm's production
strategy.26
Let us now examine the equilibrium conditions in the industry. Let
Q(p) be the random distribution of demand at price p. Let C(F) be the
cost of learning for certain the demands of F percent of the population,
with C'(F) > 0. Let S be the amount that is supplied by the fringe. The
value of S will be unchanged over time because ex ante the world always
looks the same to the competitive fringe (i.e., the dominant firm is able to
keep secret its future production plans from the competitive fringe).
Because of the assumption of constant returns to scale, the expected price
must equal the constant cost of production cinequilibrium. The domi-
nant firm will use the residual demand curve to determine its optimal
investment in information and its production response to that informa-
tion. Let m(-y,F)be the amount the dominant firm supplies when it
observes random state of demand -y after it has sampled F percent of total
demand.27 Price will be determined by the condition
Is
(2) =m(y,F) + S.
Ir
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For a fixed F, S, and strategy {m(-',i, F)} and for a random -y and (2)
induces a distribution on price p. Call this distribution f1(p; F, S,
m(-y, F)), which we abbreviate as fi(p). It is this distribution that will
determine whether there is an incentive for the competitive fringe to
expand or contract. In equilibrium it must be the case that the size of the
competitive fringe S is such that the expected value of price equals c, the
constant marginal production cost, or
(3) fpf1(p)dp=c.
The dominant firm will realize how S is determined and will take (3)
into account in determining its optimal supply strategy. We can think of
(3) as establishing a relation between S and the strategy {m(-y,F)} of the 0
dominantfirm. In other words, since the dominant firm's supply strategy a
affects the price distribution, which affects the size of the competitive
fringe, the dominant firm will act like a Stackelberg competitor taking (3)
as determining the competitive fringe's response to his strategy.
How is m(-y, F) determined? For the, moment let us hold F constant and d
ignoreinformation acquisition costs C(F). For fixedS, F, -y, and m(-y, F),
(2) induces a distribution onp. Call this distributionf2(p).28 (If F =1,no d
residualrandomness is left after the information acquisition takes place
and f2(p) is degenerate. Remember that the dominant firm only observes
the random demand of F percent of the market. The observed -y refers
only to the first F percent of the market.) Expected profits, condi-




I Themonopolist wants to choose a strategy that maximizes the expecta-
tion of ir1(m(-y, F)) when -yis regarded as random. The monopolist
• therefore maximizes 'rr(F) =E(1T1(m(-y,F))) with expectations taken
with respect toFinally, the monopolist chooses the optimal amount of e
investment in information by maximizing 'rr(F) —C(F)or equivalently
by choosing F such that S
e
(4) rr'(F) =C'(F). 01
Throughoutthe maximization, the relation between S and m(-y, F) as
summarized in (3) is taken into account.
•
The above formulation can be used to determine the optimal F, op-
timal strategy, m(-y,F), and resulting S that characterize equilibrium in
the model. One interesting feature of this model is that the dominant firm
will find it optimal to produce positive output even when the expected
price is below the constant costs of production. In other words, even if the
15
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amount supplied by the competitive fringe that price will be below the
constant production costs, the dominant firm may still choose to produce.
This strategy is profit maximizing for the firm because although the firm
loses money when it produces when price is below constant production
costs, if it did not produce in those demand states then the price distribu-
tion would be affected in such a way as to encourage entry. This resulting
entry would reduce profits of the dominant firm in all states of demand.
The dominant firm follows a conscious policy of trying to keep price low
in some states to discourage entry so that when demand is high, the
dominant firm can reap high monopoly profits.
There is one inessential indeterminacy in the problem that becomes
obvious on reflection. Suppose that the monopolist's optimal output m as
a function of the observed state of nature -y is m(y).29 Let
minm(y)>O.
Suppose the competitive output is S. Notice that the price distribution,
output produced, and monopoly profits are unchanged if we consider the
equilibrium monopoly output m*(y) =m(y)+andequilibrium com-
petitive supply S—for
Since on any fixed amount of outputexpected profits are zero, we see
that the relevant issue is not the size of the monopolist's output relative to
the competitive fringe, but rather the variation in the monopolist's output
above some fixed level. As long as a firm produces a fixed amount of
output, it makes no difference whether we regard the firm as part of the
competitive fringe or as a division of the dominant firm. For expositional
ease, in the example to follow I will make S as large as possible so that
minm(-y) =0.
-y
However,the reader should bear in mind that this assumption has no
effect on the market equilibrium.
A simple example is the easiest way to illustrate the above points and
show how the dominant firm can solve for its optimal strategy. In the
example, we will for simplicity initially suppress the decision of the firm to
optimally acquire information.
Assume that some dominant firm either has perfect information about
demand or has determined that it is optimal for it to be perfectly in-
formed. Let the market demand curve be
D(p) =a—p+€,
whereisa random variable with mean 0 and variance cr2,p is price, and a
is a constant. (For purposes of this section, the probability distribution of
neednot be specified.) Let S stand for the output of the competitive62 Dennis W. Canton
fringe. Production by the competitive fringe must occur before price is
observed. Competitive entry will occur until expected price equals con-
stant production cost c. Since cx ante the world always looks the same to
the competition fringe, S will be a constant. The residual demand curve
facing the dominant firm is
By assumption, the dominant firm has invested in information and knows
before production decisions are made. Let m(e) represent the optimal
output of the dominant firm whenis observed. Then price is a random variablethat varies asvaries. Price is determined by the condition





The above equation determines the distribution of price. In particular,
the expected value of price is
E(p) =a—S—E[m(€)].





This last condition determines S as a function of the entire output
strategy of the dominant firm. The dominant firm recognizes this inter-
dependence and takes it into account in determining its optimal strategy. I
Wecan now write down the dominant firm's optimization problem.3° The
dominant firm wishes to choose the function m(€) to maximize the
expected value of profits with price being determined by (5) and the size
d of the competitive fringe being determined by (6).




subject to p(€) =a—S—m(€)+€,and S =a—c—fm(€) dG(€),
where G(€) is the cumulative density of the random variable €.
Substitutingp(€) and S into the profit expression, we obtain the follow- -
ingcalculus of variations problem:
max f[m — m(€) +€]m(€)dG(€),
m(e)
whereñì= E(m(€)).
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1S Consider the variation 6s(€) around the optimal policy m(E). Let m*(e)
= m(€) +&s(€),and therefore = Th(€) + where a bar stands
to for expected value. Substitute m*(e) into the objective function and set
ye the derivative with respect to S equal to 0 when S is zero. This derivative
with respect to S must3t equal 0 if m(€) is the optimal policy. Performing
these calculations, one finds that the solution is
ws S=a—c—K,
al (7) m(€)+S=a—c+€/2, and p=c+e/2,
rn
)fl where K is a constant.
To avoid the indeterminacy of K and in view of the previous discussion,
we let Emin=mmand set Kmin = €minh2. Setting K =Kmjnin (7) ensures
that
minm(e)=0
so that m(€) ￿ 0 for all
Noticethat when 0, p(€) —c< 0, yet the dominant firm still
produces a positive quantity. Price being below marginal cost does not
imply that marginal revenue is below marginal cost for the dominant firm.
As discussed earlier, the feedback of the output strategy on the size of the
competitive fringe explains this result. The dominant firm's strategy then
is to produce in all states—but to produce the most when demand and
price are the highest. This profit maximizing behavior can be viewed as a
sophisticated form of "predatory" or "limit" pricing in which the domi-
nant firm occasionally chooses to produce and sell at prices below mar-
ginal cost in an effort to control the size of the competitive fringe.
it The expected profits of the optimally behaving dominant firm equal
f =
whereo2 is the vare. This result is intuitively appealing. The advantage of
e the dominant firm is its ability to detect changes in demand. The level of
demand will only influence the size of the competitive fringe. Therefore,
profits of the dominant firm will depend on the changes (variability) in
demand and not on the average level of demand.
The deviation of price from marginal cost equals €12 so that the ex-
pected deadweight loss to society from the dominant firm equalsa-2.
Even though the competitive output derived in section 2.2 and the
expected market output in this case33 are identical, because output of the
dominant firm varies in response to €, the deadweight loss is lower in a
market structure with a dominant firm and competitive fringe than in a
purely competitive market.34 The intuitive reason for this result is that the
competitive fringe removes any persistent expected distortions between
price and marginal cost, while the dominant firm, even though it follows ar
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"predatory" policy, makes sure that industry output responds to shifts in
demand. Any laws limiting the ability of the dominant firm to respond to
demand fluctuations (such as one prohibiting production if price is below
c) will tend to increase deadweight loss.
In the preceding example, the optimal choice of information invest-
ment was suppressed and for expositional simplicity was taken to be
complete (the fraction F =1of the population was surveyed by the
dominant firm). The level of F will of course determine the type of j
uncertaintyin demand that the dominant firm and competitive fringe
face. The marginal cost of information will influence the optimal F, which
will in turn influence the size of the competitive fringe. If no information
is collected by the monopolist, then all market power vanishes and we
approach the (unplanned) competitive equilibrium discussed in section
2.2. If complete investment (F =1)takes place, then we approach the
market equilibrium just presented.
To examine these points more concretely, consider the more general
demand curve used earlier:
where 0< F< 1, V1 and V2 are independent random variables with mean 0
and variance 0.2(forpurposes of this section, the probability distributions
of V1 and V2 need not be specified), the realization of V1 can be
observed at cost C(F), and V2is unobservable at the time produc-
tion must occur. Following the steps presented earlier in this section for
determining the optimal policy, it follows that, for fixed F, the optimal
strategy of the dominant firm as a function of the observed V1 and the
resulting equilibrium are given by
VI S=a—c—K, S+m(V1)=a—c+——V1,
Tr(F) = (ignoring information acquisition costs),
where K is the arbitrary constant discussed earlier. If C(F) is the cost of
finding out about Fpercent of the population, the optimal F(assuming an
interior solution) satisfies =a214= C'(F),Recalling the results of
section 2.3, we see that although the profits of the dominant firm are
lower than those of the monopolist, the incentives to invest in informa-
tion are unchanged. This result is not of course general. The differences
in information investment will in general depend on the differences in
behavior of the marginal revenue schedule to new information in the
regions of the monopoly and dominant firm output (see the discussion in
the appendix). (
Ifwe measure the size of the competitive fringe by the minimum output
that is always produced,35 then it is clear from the solution just presented65 Planning and Market Structure
that the size of the competitive fringe shrinks as investment in informa-
a tion (i.e., F) increases. The optimal F increases as the variance of
demand increases and as the marginal cost of information falls. There-
w fore, it follows that the larger the variance of demand and the lower the
marginal cost of information, the smaller the size of the competitive
fringe. It also follows that under the same conditions, the profits of the
e dominant firm rise.36
2.7Summary and Conclusions
We have examined market structure in markets where knowledge of
the next period's demand is socially beneficial to suppliers since it enables
suppliers to better plan their production. When demand is random, the
purely competitive market does not generate the correct incentives for
collection of the information about the demand uncertainty. Although
private institutions might develop to collect such information, because of
the usual problems with appropriability of information, there is no reason
to believe that the socially optimal amount of information will be col-
lected. Examination of the monopoly case showed that although the
monopoly firm does have an incentive to invest resources in planning and
thereby does adjust its output to demand fluctuations, the deadweight
losses from the monopoly are likely to swamp any losses that arise from
not planning in the purely competitive case.
We next examined a market structure with a dominant firm(s) and
competitive fringe. This market structure could arise if one or a few
colluding firms had sole access to information acquisition or if, as a result
of the natural incentives to merge, one or a few colluding firms emerge
that are able to maintain and exercise market power. Analysis of this
market structure showed that the size of the competitive fringe would be
positively related to the marginal cost of information and negatively
related to the variance of demand. The profits of the dominant firm would
be positively related to the variability in demand and negatively related to
• the total and marginal cost of information. The dominant firm follows a
S "predatory"policy designed to limit the size of the competitive fringe.
The dominant firm produces even when price is below marginal cost in
order to keep the competitive fringe small and thereby increase its
monopoly returns when demand is high. The dominant firm has an
incentive to vary its output in response to demand fluctuations. The
presence of the competitive fringe removes any persistent distortion
between price and marginal cost. As a result, the deadweight loss to
society from a market structure consisting of a dominant firm with a
competitive fringe is lower than the deadweight loss from a market
structure of either pure competition (with no planning) or pure monopoly
(with planning).
The links between information, planning market structure, and be-r
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havior seem to be sufficiently strong to warrant further research. Under-
standing these links could improve our understanding of differences in
market behavior. For example, in markets with little planning the varia-
tion of prices should be greater than in markets with much planning,
while just the reverse should be true for quantity variation. In markets
with planning, contracts may be the mechanism by which demanders
convey information to suppliers and which suppliers use to make sure
that what demanders predict for their demands turns out to be their
demands. A contract37 specifying a quantity to be bought at tomorrow's
prevailing price plus a discount equal to the demander's information cost
of predicting demand could emerge as the most efficient mechanism for
suppliers to acquire information.
Knowledge of the link between market behavior and structure and
planning and information could also be useful in the formulation of a
coherent public policy toward market structure. When the purely com-
petitive outcome is not the socially desirable one, one must treat propos-
als to break up industries into atomistic competitors very cautiously. On
the one hand, if entry barriers in production exist, then the analysis of the
pure monopoly case in section 2.5 suggests that in most instances the
argument that planning would be harmed by deconcentration should not
be considered a valid defense. On the other hand, if no production
advantages are present and a competitive fringe exists, then the analysis
of section 2.6 suggests that the planning argument, if true, should indeed
be considered a reasonable defense.
Appendix: Investment in Information:
Monopolist versus Social Planner
In this appendix we discuss the conditions under which a monopolist will
tend to underinvest in information relative to the social optimum. The
conditions required seem sufficiently plausible to make the underinvest-
ment result the most likely case. However, to dispel any notion that the
underinvestment result must occur, we offer the following counterex-
ample.
Suppose that there are only two possible states of demand as repre-
sented by the two demand curves shown in figure 2.1.
Let marginal cost equal $5. The social planner will maximize expected
consumer surplus by producing any quantity in excess of 200. The social J
planner has absolutely no incentive to invest in information to find out
which state of demand will prevail. The monopolist, on the other hand,
has an incentive to invest in information to determine whether he should
produce slightly less than 100 units and earn profits of about $500 or
whether he should produce slightly less than 200 and earn profits of about
$1,000. The fact that the change in revenue for the monopolist can be67 Planning and Market Structure
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much greater than the change in demand price is what generates the
a incentive for the monopolist to overinvest.
If we rule out very different behavior in the response of the marginal
revenue (MR) and inverse demand (P) function to new information in the
region of the monopoly solution and social optimum, respectively, then
we will tend to see the monopolist underinvesting in information. The
reason is simple—and is easiest to explain when (using the notation of
t section 2.3) the effect of the random demand component V1 is symmetric
on and BMR/aF (i.e., (aP/afl (— V1) =— (aP/aF)(V1)) and the
S errordistribution V1 is symmetric. Assume that 3P/8F and are
approximately equal on the relevant ranges so that new information does
not shift the MR curve by more than it shifts the P curve.38
Using the notation of section 2.4, we have
SUR(F) = V1, V2,F)dq—cS(Vi,F)],
where isthe cumulative density of V, and S(V1, F) has been chosen





The monopolist's profits equal
S'(V1.F)
= [MR(q) —c]dq,
where MR(q) is marginal revenue at output q andis chosen optimally
(i.e.,. S*(V1, F) maximizes fthj,2f [MR(q,V1,V2,F) — c]dq). The en-
velope theorem allows us to calcglate rr'(F) as
(A2) = = R
dq.
From the symmetry assumption, it follows that SUR'(F) >
providedthat
Sr
68 Dennis W. Canton
1'
S(V1,F) S*(V1,F)8MR f dqexceedsf dq.
S(—V1,F) S*(_V1,F)ar
In general, the range [S(V1, F), S( —V1,F)] will tend to be wider than the j
range[S*(V1, F), S*(—V1,F)]. This follows directly from our assump-
tions since it can be shown that 8S*J8VS exceeds aS/a V1,39 so that a d
monopolist will tend to respond less to demand fluctuations than a social








We expect then that provided the behavior of MR and P to new informa-
tion in the relevant ranges is not too dissimilar, the monopolist will tend





1. This paragraph makes rigorous the ideas of the previous paragraph. This paragraph
can be omitted if the reader is willing to accept that a demand curve like equation (1) is a
consistent with the ideas of the previous paragraph.
2. For simplicity, throughout this paper we ignore the nonnegativity constraint on price
and quantity. The probability of negative values can be made arbitrarily small by appropri.
ate choice of a and a2. tI
3. Alternatively, at a cost, it is possible to reduce the prediction error of total demand
below a2 w
4. F will be a number between 0 and 1. However, for expositional simplicity we will talk w
about the first Fpercentof the market, rather than the first 100 F percent of the market. w
5. Alternatively, the information investment of C(F)haslowered the prediction error of
demand from a2 to (1 —F)a2.
Analternative, perhaps more readable and less rigorous, derivation goes as follows:
Imagine that there are N demanders each of whom has a demand curve f(p) + I=
1 N,whereareindependent normal random variables with mean 0 and variance a2.
Total mean demand is Nf(p), while the variance of demand is Na2. We want to let the
number of demanders become large and the demand curve change so that (a) each
demander becomes an infinitesimally small part of the market and (b)themean and
variance of total industry demand remain bounded and approach some finite values. One
way to do this is to let N approachat the same rate that expected demand per agent
approaches zero and at the same rate that the variance of e, goes to zero. For example, if
agents in any interval [Z0± dZ, Z01demand (a —p)dZ + where q has mean zero
and variance a2, then the total demand of agents in [Z0+dZ,Z0] isgoing to zero as is the
variance. However, the total demand in the intervalZE[0,11 can be written as a —pplus a
normal random variable with mean 0 and variance a2. If demands of agents in the interval
S
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[OF] are added to the (independent) demands of agents in the interval [F,1], we obtain total
demand; hence, total demand can be written as
a—p+W1(F)+W2(1—F),
where W1(F) and W2(1— F)are independent normal random variables with mean 0 and
variances Fci2 and (1 — respectively. (See Cox and Miller 1970 for a more detailed
discussion.)
6. Similar results emerge as long as suppliers must make some commitment to production
before demand is known.
7.It is, of course, irrelevant whether the demander hires someone else to figure out his
future demand or whether he does it himself.
8. Restrictions on the ability to borrow and to save to smooth income over time as well as
ignorance of the relevant price distributions can sometimes alter the preference of demand-
ers for variable versus fixed prices (see Hanoch 1974). These conditions seem unlikely to
apply to firms. We ignore these conditions in the remainder of the paper.
9. The arguments in this paragraph can be restated precisely as follows: It can be shown
that in competitive equilibrium with expected price equal to c, the marginal gain in a
supplier's profits from knowing an agent's demand is of order dZ2 while the marginal cost of
acquiring the information is of order dZ. Therefore, no (infinitesimal) supplier has an
incentive to acquire information. Only if suppliers areof finite measure and thereby have
some market power to prevent expected price from equaling c can there be an incentive for a
supplier to purchase information from a demander.
10. This point is similar to the one Arrow (1971) makes about incentives for discovery of
new production techniques that will be widely copied immediately after their introduction.
It is also related to the point that Green (1973), Grossman (1976, 1977), and Grossman and
Stiglitz (1976, 1980) analyze in the context of efficient markets.
11. A trade association of demanders that reveals information to suppliers runs into the
same problem.
12. With correlated demands and costs to information acquisition, a futures market
among demanders cannot exist if price accurately aggregates demand information (Green
1973; Grossman and Stiglitz 1976). A "noisy" futures market (i.e. ,one where price does not
reveal completely the knowledge of the informed traders [Grossman and Stiglitz 1980])
could provide an incentive for demanders to acquire information, earn a return on it, and
thereby transmit "noisy" information to suppliers. Suppliers would then have an incentive
to contact the knowledgeable demanders to get rid of the "noise" in the signal, and then
would be back to the situation discussed above where firms have incentives to merge and
where competitive firms adjust production until expected price equals marginal cost at
which point incentives for information transmission vanish.
Ostroy's comments which criticize me for never having considered the case of correlated
demands completely baffle me in light of the paragraph in the text above. Correlated
demands do not eliminate the externality problem, contrary to Ostroy's comments. The
externality problem persists under competition regardless of the stochastic demand struc-
lure.
Incidentally, Ostroy's criticism of the independent stochastic setup of demand is un-
founded. Ostroy criticizes the assumption of the independence of individual demands
because it implies that the fraction of individual demand that is explained by price becomes
vanishingly small relative to the fraction of aggregate demand explained by price—and
Ostroy knows of no justification for this result. Ostroy's "criticism" is equivalent to the
• "criticism" that the R2 of an equation based on aggregate data is higher than the R2 of art
equation based on less aggregate data, and that the R2 falls as the data become more
• disaggregated. Contrary to Ostroy's implication, such behavior of R2 is indeed common
(see, e.g., p. 181 of Theil 1971). This behavior provides an empirical confirmation of the
applicability of the independent stochastic specification.r
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13. This expectation is with respect to the price distribution conditioned on the informa-
tion.
14. An alternative interpretation is that investment can be undertaken to reduce the
prediction error of demand next period by F percent.
15. Expectation is taken with respect to V2.
16. Expectation is taken with respect to V1.
17. The analysis assumes that expected consumer surplus is the appropriate indicator of
welfare. See Carlton (1978) for an examination of this issue.
18. Expectation is taken with respect to V2.
19. See appendix for more detailed discussion.
20. This comparison favors monopoly because it follows from the model that the dead-
weight loss of a monopolist falls as information acquisition costs decline to zero, and he
acquires more information about demand to improve his planning.
21. In a continuous time model of demand with cost of adjustment, "long" and "short"
run are not precise terms. The basic point is that in equilibrium, monopoly price can be a
constant. Although raising price above this constant might initially lead to high profits,
eventually, after demand has adjusted, total profits will fall. A monopolist may operate in
the inelastic portion of his (very) "short-run" demand curve.
22. The fact that price variability can affect demand by influencing preferences for
technologies with lots of substitution possibilities would also have to be taken into account a4
in comparing monopoly to competition. Since the price variability of monopoly is closer to
that of the social optimum than is the price variability of competition, we expect this effect to
improve the position of monopoly relative to competition.
23. Earlier, we also briefly discussed incentives to merge among buyers. We henceforth A
ignore this possibility by making the implicit assumption that it is very costly to organize a
buyers, though not sellers. However, the reader should realize that the subsequent analysis
could easily be redone with a dominant buyer (not seller) who gathers information, a
non—information gathering group of buyers, and competitive sellers.
24. Recall that if firms which acquire information do not collude to restrict output, then it
is impossible for there to exist an equilibrium that provides incentives for information
acquisition in the model under examination.
25. This cost could be in the form of a price lower than the monopoly one. The point is
that a useful theory of oligopoly may be one that postulates similar patterns of behavior to A
the oligopoly as a monopolist would exhibit but that allows the returns to the oligopoly to be
below those of the monopoly because of the difficulty of colluding.
26. The reader who is not interested in the general solution to this problem can skip to the
B paragraph after equation (4).
27. The monopolist observes that 'y is the value of a random parameter (a sufficient
statistic) for the first Fpercent of total market demand. If no sufficient statistic exists, then C
can be regarded as the vector of random components for the first F percent of the market.
28. Recall thatf1(p) was based on the assumption that F, S, p) were fixed but -y was
random.
29. For notational simplicity, we henceforth will suppress Fin writing m(-y, F) and simply
use m(-y) to stand for the firm's optimal strategy.
30. Several nonnegativity constraints are being ignored for simplicity. We later give an
example to show that there is a solution with these constraints satisfied.




all required nonnegativity constraints is c =2,a =10,anduniformon [—1,1]. The
optimal strategy is m(€) =sf2+ ½, the competitive fringe output is S =7½,and the price is
p(s) =2+ €12.
I
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33. Recall that market output S + m(E1)= a—c +
e 34. Even if we assume the profits are dissipated by cartel enforcement costs and therefore
include profits as part of the deadweight loss, the conclusion stated in the text is valid.
35. Whether the constant amount is produced by the dominant firm or a competitive firm
is irrelevant. No monopoly profits can be made on this output.
36. More precisely, if we perturb the initial optimal solution by lowering the marginal
cost of information and by not increasing the total cost of information at the initial optimum,
then profits rise in the new optimal solution.
37. See Canton (1979b) for further discussion about the information role of contracts.
I- 38. If the (inverse) demand relation can be written as P =g(q)+ \/T V1 ÷ V2 for
Ie some with V2 independent, then these assumptions will be satisfied exactly.
39. If =aPiav1as assumed (this is the same assumption as ,9MR/,3F =aPIaF),
then the condition required for aS/a V, >aS*/3V1is simply that the slope of the MR curve





o W —— J J
Again,we see that the underinvestment result depends on how different the behavior of MR
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Comment Jean-Jacques Laffont
The message that Dennis Canton wants to transmit is clear and interest-
ing, but I will argue that he does not provide a totally convincing model
and that he ignores a number of alternatives relevant for his problem.
Information about future demand conditions of a given commodity is S
in a world of a large number of buyers and sellers, a public good. There is
a free rider problem in the financing of this public good from the point of c
view of sellers of the commodity, and demanders prefer random prices,
that is to say, no production of public good. Consequently, it is argued
that in a competitive situation no information will be bought and there-
fore that the outcome will be inefficient. Information here is some sort of i11
public input for sellers. Hence, when the seller is a monopoly, it is in his
interest to finance information gathering; indeed, the free rider problem
f
disappears since he is the only one to use that information.
I
Theauthor then compares the two inefficiencies, that associated with
monopolistic behavior on one hand and that associated with the free rider
problem on the other.. The numerical values given in this comparison are
not to be taken seriously, I think, but illustrate the trade-off.
Jean-Jacques Laffont is professor, Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse. A
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The basic assumption, which is implied by the use of a continuum, is
S that the search cost of information is, for an individual, infinitely larger
than the use he can make out of it. It is not clear to me that in this problem
- suchis necessarily the case.
First, if the seller faces a large number of stochastically independent
buyers, a small random sample may be of great value in predicting the
future demand conditions, suggesting that the modelization of the aggre-
gate demand function is rather special (see also J. Ostroy's comment).
Second, it is implicitly assumed that the market will be unable to react
to the inefficiency created by the lack of forecasting. Why does not a
(competitive) industry appear in the production of this information? The
success of DRI on the stock market suggests that selling information to a
large number of users is not so difficult despite a real public good aspect to
I it.
Third, recent literature on incentives has shown that there are many
ways in which the state can intervene to mitigate the free rider problem.
Therefore, the simple comparison between monopoly and competition
is not really policy relevant.
In the last section the author suggests that the "most likely" market
structure will be a monopoly with a fringe of competitors, but the reasons
why this should be the case remain mysterious.
Comment Joseph M. Ostroy
The author asks, "How [well] does iflformation get transmitted from
L. demandersto suppliers in a competitive market?" The answer is, "We
is show that a competitive market is uniquely unsuited to the efficient
is transmission of this information." After examination of the competitive
case, Carlton addresses the equilibrium and efficiency properties of
monopoly and dominant firm models. I shall confine my remarks to the
competitive market. My conclusion will be that the author's results can be
e- attributed to a rather extreme assumption on the stochastic properties of
Df individual demands. Once these assumptions are denied, the usual
is efficiency properties of competitive equilibrium reemerge and, unless
m there are scale economies in production (ruled out by the author),
monopoly would not arise.
th I shall focus on the demand side of the market which the author
er requires to have the following three properties:
re (I) a large number of buyers,
Joseph M. Ostroy is associate professor of economics at the University of California. Los
Angeles.
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(II) random disturbances to individual demands are independently dis-
2 tributed, and 4
(111) aggregate demand, the average of individual demands, has a non-
vanishing variance.
Condition (I) would be required for a competitive market even without
stochastic elements. Coupled with (II) no buyer/seller has much of an foIL
incentive to reveal/discover the value of anyone's random component of Va
demand because this will have little influence on market price, the Fu
medium through which rewards for such communication are obtained, ho
For example, if price will not change as a result of its discoveries, why
should a firm want to know the value of some one or a few individuals' I
random components of demand. Without (III), the market-clearing price
will not fluctuate and the market will behave as if individual demands
were perfectly certain.
An appeal to Laws of Large Numbers would appear to contradict the di
existence of (I), (II), and (III). We may have (I) and (III) if, for example, w
the random components of individual demands are perfectly correlated. gi
We may have (II) and (III) if the number of buyers is small. And (I) and N
(II) are compatible if we rule out (III). How then can we achieve (I)— re
(Ill)? The answer is that we must require the variance of each individual's th
demand to overwhelm the price-determined, or nonrandom, component.
=(Xi',...,X,7),where foreachi=1
let Il,, ={w,,}.It will also be convenient to define =
The demand side of a market with n agents is denotedand is defined
by the n demand functions d1: 1=1,... ,n, where Di
=f(p) + X,'2.
We are assuming that each agent's demand is composed of the sum of a
deterministic termf(p) that does not vary with the particular agent in col
or the size of the market, and a random term X[1 that varies with I and n.
Condition (II), independence, is obtained by assuming each w,, E fi,, rat
has probability Therefore, =0and var (Xc) = Note be
that while the mean of individual random variables is independent of i v(
and n, the variance of individual demand may depend on the number of
agents in the market. dis
Because n will vary, normalize quantities so that aggregate demand
D,,(p,w,,) is average demand—i.e., Th
=n' =f(p) + th(
Hc
(This is in line with the author's analysis.)
The following result is a corollary of the Kolmogorov version of the an'
Strong Law of Large Numbers (W. Feller, Introduction to Probability
Theory and Its Applications, vol. 1, 2d ed. [New York: Wiley], pp.
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1S 243—44): then for any >0 and S >0, there is an N such
thatforn>N,
ut Therefore, if the standard deviation of individual demands Cr,, is uni-
an formly bounded, the stochastic component of aggregate demand
vanishes. (This follows from the standard version of the Strong Law.)
he Further, even if but not as rapidly as the same conclusion
d. holds. Thus, the only possibility for achieving (I)—(III) is to add
hy (IV) — 0.
Is'
ce The objection may be made that (IV) is needed simply because the
ds definition of aggregate demand is average demand. This is certainly true,
but as far as the implications for competitive analysis are concerned
division by n is warranted. Let p" be the competitive equilibrium price
when there is no randomness (or,, =0)—i.e.,equalsthe constant mar-
d. ginal cost assumed in the paper. Assume for convenience that f(p*) =1.
Now suppose sellers supply nf(p*) =nunits each period and that the
realized market-clearing price p fluctuates aroundto compensate for
l's the realized value of
Realized price will be a function ofthat solves the demand =supply
equation
Dividing by n, p varies withto satisfy
1.
a Again, we reach the conclusion that the distribution of realized prices
collapses onunless we admit (IV).
These results indicate that if cr,, is uniformly bounded and n is large, the
randomness can be ignored. However, there is a small difficulty. Let 'I,,
•te be the distribution of prices in M,, when sellers supply nf(p*), and let
11 v(c1,,) be the value of the loss attributed by a typical buyer to c1,, as
compared with a distribution which has all its mass on The latter
distribution might be achieved by permitting buyers to communicate the
realizations of their random variables before supply decisions are made.
There does not seem to be any guarantee that what might be called here
the value of perfect information nv(t',,) goes to zero as ii increases.
However, such losses appear to be unavoidable.
Presumably, there is some cost c of communication of the realization of
any buyer's random variable. By independence, total costs of communica-
tionvary directly with the number of buyers in the market, e.g., nc.When
'IP Cr,, is uniformly bounded above, we may conclude that since 1,, collapses
1•J r
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1'
topa', 0.Therefore, the net benefits of communication to
completely stable prices are
nis sufficiently large.
If the error terms were dependent, all of the above would change. Take
the extreme case where the error terms are perfectly correlated: X"=
impliesX7 =ci,,with probability one. Clearly, sincewould take only
the values or —with equal probability, the variance of individual
and average demand would be identical and there would be no need to
consider increasing Now the question of communication becomes
more interesting. Knowledge of one buyer's error term tells you every-
thing. It would be redundant for all suppliers individually to discover the
value of the random variable or for all buyers to communicate their
identical information. But which buyer will reveal it, or how many sellers
will try to discover it? Because he assumes independence, these problems
cannot arise in the author's formulation of the problem.
Returning to the model under discussion, we have shown that (I)—(III) 9
implies(IV). This means that the proportion of an individual's demand




I know of no precedent, empirical or theoretical, to justify (IV). Perhaps d
it might be used as a mathematical expression of the idea that in some
markets individual demands are simply not very much influenced by price v
even though aggregate demand appears to be! But this would be the a
starting point for a very different paper.
Pd
3.